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FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS AND THE WHOLLY INTERNAL
RULE: TIME TO MOVE ON?
NIAMH NIC SHUIBHNE∗
1. Introduction
The expectation that EC law is invoked only where a given situation falls
within the scope of the Treaty might seem too obvious even to be stated. In
particular, activating EC law on the free movement of persons has depended
traditionally – and fairly logically – on a basic notion residing firmly within
that phrase: a requirement of movement, from the territory of one Member
State to that of another, thus generating the requisite cross-border element.1
Basically: no movement, no free movement protection. Again, this would
seem fair and sensible. The resultant existence of “reverse” discrimination –
where a (static) home national may be treated less favourably than someone
from another Member State who could invoke EC law in similar factual cir-
cumstances – is usually conceived as an unusual but inevitable, and accept-
able, corollary of non-interference by the Community in the internal affairs of
the Member States. This conclusion, however, can no longer be drawn quite
so readily.
First, the span of Community law affecting “persons” has stretched appre-
ciably in recent years, so that the reserve of “purely internal” issues is con-
siderably reduced as a result. On the one hand, the objectives of the original
Treaty of Rome no longer reflect the scope of EC reality – or ambition.
∗ Lecturer in EC Law, University of Edinburgh. Thanks to Rachael Craufurd Smith,
Robert Lane and Michael O’Neill for comments on an earlier draft, and for the conversations
leading to it. Thanks also to Dieter Kraus and Helen Toner.
1. Not all cross-border circumstances have been allowed to trigger the application of the
Treaty (see esp. Case C-112/91, Werner v. Finanzamt Aachen-Innenstadt, [1993] ECR I-429);
the continuing legitimacy of this decision has been called into question, however, as discussed
in Section 4 below. It should also be noted that movement in a physical sense is not necessary
in the context of services, see e.g. the decisions in Case C-18/93, Corsica Ferries Italia v.
Corpo dei Piloti del Porto di Genova, [1994] ECR I-1783; Case C-384/93, Alpine Investments
v. Minister van Financie¨n, [1995] ECR I-1141 – but the requisite cross-border element requires
still to be satisfied (see e.g. Case C-60/91, Criminal Proceedings against Morais, [1992] ECR
I-2085, in which it was observed, at para 7, that “. . . the Court has consistently held that the
Treaty provisions on free movement of persons and services cannot be applied to activities
which are confined in all respects within a single Member State. . . .”).
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The creation of EU citizenship at Maastricht, as well as the immigration
policy competence effected at Amsterdam, are especially illustrative here.
Moreover, the gradual expansion of (horizontal) direct effect by the Court of
Justice – most recently in respect of Article 39 EC2 – means that the reach
of Community protection has spread also in a less obvious sense. All of this
feeds into the relative ease with which a Community connection can now
be established. Finally, the typical invocation of the Treaty does still involve
some cross-border element, but the range of circumstances in which indi-
viduals seek to rely on EC law against their own Member States continues to
broaden.
There is clearly a whole variety of issues which belong properly within
national competence; it is not the intention here to argue for wholly omni-
potent EC institutions. But, in the specific context of the free movement of
persons, it is becoming more and more difficult to make sense of situations
left outside the EC protection net – to rationalize why crossing an intern-
al (regional) border might require the payment of university fees whereas
crossing an external (but intra-EU) border does not; why a third country
national parent may only come to join his/her Community national offspring
if the latter leaves his/her own Member State; why a qualification obtained
in another Member State can provide the key to an employment competition
or a better salary where an equivalent home diploma might not; or why the
third country national spouse of an EU citizen might be able to reside with
their spouse (and even engage in economic activity) in every Member State
but their spouse’s own. These are the types of situations which can generate
reverse discrimination. Of course, there is a strong argument that it is up to
the Member States individually to redress imbalances between national and
Community standards. But this assertion begins to lose its potency against
the backdrop of EU fundamental rights protection, so solemnly “proclaimed”
at Nice,3 and the internal effect of both the Framework and Race Directives
adopted under Article 13 EC.4 And it becomes even more difficult to justi-
fy the reverse discrimination anomaly in light of the awaking animation of
Union citizenship in ECJ case law, as well as in legislative proposals tabled
recently by the Commission. It is not so much that movement is problematic
or redundant as a criterion in itself; it is more that the profound extent to
which Community law can now bear on a person’s life seems increasingly
2. See Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, [2000] ECR
I-4139, para 36.
3. For further discussion of reverse discrimination in the specific context of the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights, see Nic Shuibhne, “The EU and fundamental rights: Well in spirit but
considerably rumpled in body?”, in Beaumont, Lyons and Walker (Eds.), Convergence and
Divergence in European Public Law (Oxford, Hart, 2002), pp. 177–196.
4. Directive 2000/78/EC, O.J. 2000, L 303/16 and Directive 2000/43/EC, O.J. 2000, L
180/22 respectively.
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to devalue movement as a precondition for these advantages to adhere in the
first place.
This paper first charts the entrenchment of the wholly internal rule in
the context of Article 39 EC; the more normative debate on the character
of reverse discrimination – is it nationality discrimination, or is it something
else? – will also be introduced. The ways in which this seemingly clear-cut rule
has actually been unsettled will then be explored, looking at the expansionist
trends raised above and the extent to which the purely internal reserve has
been punctured as a result. The deepening significance of EU citizenship is
especially relevant here, given the fundamental consequences that the action
of movement now generates. Some legislative and judicial choices needing to
be made will then be outlined. Finally, if reverse discrimination is established
to be a problem, consideration of how best to treat it must be discussed. Is the
problem national or “European”, legislative or judicial? The question posed
throughout, however, can be expressed at its most basic as follows: in light of
the erosion, even displacement, of the wholly internal rule now intensifying,
is it time simply to move on?
2. The beginning: Entrenching the wholly internal rule
Poiares Maduro has described Knoors,5 Auer6 and Saunders7 as “[t]he three
paradigmatic cases where the Court of Justice established the core of its
approach to reverse discrimination and purely internal situations. . . .”8 Of
these three, the classic interpretation of Article 39 EC in this context is found
in Saunders (the other two relating to freedom of establishment). Invited to
consider the legitimacy of a mobility restriction (imposed by the UK on a
British national, in the context of criminal penalties and effective within the
territory of the UK only), the Court stated succinctly that “[t]he provisions
of the Treaty on freedom of movement for workers cannot . . . be applied
to situations which are wholly internal to a Member State, in other words,
where there is no factor connecting them to any of the situations envisaged by
Community law.”9 Kon has argued, however, that “. . . the judgment does not
5. Case 115/78, Knoors v. Staatssecretaris van Economische Zaken, [1979] ECR 399.
6. Case 136/78, Ministe`re Public v. Auer, [1979] ECR 437.
7. Case 175/78, R v. Saunders, [1979] ECR 1129.
8. Poiares Maduro, “The scope of European remedies: The case of purely internal situations
and reverse discrimination”, in Kilpatrick, Novitz and Skidmore (Eds.), The Future of European
Remedies (Oxford, Hart, 2000), pp. 117–140 at 118. There is also considerable discussion of
these early cases in Kon, “Aspects of reverse discrimination in Community law”, 6 EL Rev.
(1981), 75–101 and Pickup, “Reverse discrimination and freedom of movement for workers”,
23 CML Rev. (1986), 135–156.
9. Saunders, para 11.
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fully explain why the Court chooses to take such a restrictive view as to when
a State can be guilty of discrimination against its own nationals and such an
extensive view of the competence retained by Member States in being entitled
to accord differential treatment to their own nationals.”10 This criticism lies
essentially in the Court’s strict reading of Article 39(3), the wording of which
arguably allowed for a broader construction (“. . . to move freely within the
territory of Member States . . . ”) or, in other words, for internal application,
akin to Article 141 EC on sex discrimination. The Treaty provisions on social
policy reflect, on one view, objectives of an entirely different character, the
need to “move” from one Member State to another before EC law protection
can be triggered being, therefore, immaterial;11 yet, ironically, when later
determining the direct effect of Article 39(2), the Court drew expressly from
the Article 141 ethos, citing the need for uniformity of protection, from
the perspective of workers, in the labour market.12 In Saunders, however,
the Court located the objectives of Article 39 firmly within the ambit of
the provision’s more predominant themes – movement and the protection of
migrant, not home, workers.13 Advocate General Warner had taken quite a
different interpretative view, unpicking the various elements of Article 39 and
severing the objectives of equal treatment and free movement.14
A closer reading of the judgment in Saunders offers, however, something
of a textual ambiguity; the Court actually confined the decision very specific-
ally to the powers of the Member States in the criminal law context, while
observing also that “. . . the rights conferred upon workers by Article [39] may
lead the Member States to amend their legislation, where necessary, even with
respect to their own nationals. . . .”15 Wyatt and Dashwood cite Article 2(1)
10. Kon, op. cit. supra note 8, 90.
11. See e.g. the voluminous case law generated by the (vertical and horizontal) direct effect
of Art. 141 EC on equal pay and equal treatment, starting with Case 43/75, Defrenne v. SABENA
(No. 2), [1976] ECR 455.
12. See Angonese, supra note 2, para 34. On the wording of Art. 39 more generally, see
Pickup, op. cit. supra note 8, at 154, who discusses also the somewhat open-ended wording
of Art. 12 EC; that provision, despite early suggestions to the contrary, also demands a cross-
border element, only then generating an obligation of “. . . complete equality of treatment
between persons in a situation governed by Community law and nationals of the Member State
in question.” (Case C-122/96, Saldanha and MTS Securities Corporation v. Hiross Holding
AG, [1997] ECR I-5325, para 25) Whether the absence of a national comparator in immigration
cases involving Title IV EC will advance this traditional understanding of Art. 12 remains to
be seen.
13. Saunders, para 9.
14. Saunders, Opinion of A.G. Warner, especially at 1142–4. On the substantive point, the
A.G. upheld the legitimacy of the restriction in terms of public policy and the powers of the
Member States in the criminal law context (see 1144–5).
15. Saunders, para 10 (emphasis added). The deferential tone adopted in terms of criminal
competence has itself been criticized. Kon, has argued that “[i]t appears unduly restrictive . . . to
state that the application of penal measures which exclusively deprive or restrict the freedom
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of Directive 68/360 in this context, since it obliges Member States to allow
their own nationals to leave their home State in order to work in another, thus
generating some connection with the exercise of Community rights.16 But the
aspect of the decision which has become entrenched is its clear statement of
the wholly internal rule, reaffirmed time and again thereafter.17
As noted at the outset, the area of immigration law and family reunification
is one in which reverse discrimination can be seen most clearly to occur. In
Morson and Jhanjan, for example, the applicants (both nationals of Surin-
ame) were not able to invoke EC law in order to claim a right to reside in
the Netherlands with their daughter and son respectively, both Netherlands
nationals. Both applicants satisfied the criterion of dependency, but neither of
their children had moved to another Member State to work. Drawing from the
restrictive tenets of Saunders, the Court maintained that neither Article 12 nor
Article 39 EC could be invoked; this conclusion stemmed from both the word-
ing (although, as noted above, on arguably inconclusive logic) and purpose
of both provisions, “. . . which is to assist in the abolition of all obstacles to
the establishment of a common market in which the nationals of the Member
States may move freely within the territory of those States in order to pursue
their economic activities.”18 As introduced already, and discussed in detail
below, whether this particular purpose can still be held to reflect the contem-
porary scope of EC law is far from certain. But it is ingrained, for now, that
the requisite cross-border element cannot be provided by movement from a
third country to a Member State; the Treaty can only come into play once the
of movement of a national worker in respect of acts committed within the territory of that state
will always fall outside Community competence” Kon, op. cit. supra note 8, 90. The facts of
both Saunders and, more recently, Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Austria, [1997] ECR I-2629,
meant that the Court did not have to address the substantive point in any meaningful manner;
it is interesting to speculate, however, on how the Court might have dealt with Kremzow, in
particular, had the applicant had a job offer in another Member State, for example. In a different
context, see Case C-348/96, Criminal Proceedings against Donatella Calfa, [1999] ECR I-11,
where the proportionality of the expulsion for life of a Community national from the territory
of a Member State in which she had been a tourist was challenged – successfully – on the basis
of her freedom to provide and receive services.
16. Arnull, Dashwood, Ross and Wyatt, Wyatt and Dashwood’s European Union Law, 4th
ed. (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p. 383; Directive 68/360 (abolition of restrictions on
movement and workers for workers and their families) J.O. 1968 L 257/13. The implications
and full extent of this right were developed recently in Case C-370/90, R v. Immigration
Appeal Tribunal and Singh, ex parte Secretary of State for the Home Department, [1992]
ECR I-4265, discussed in detail below, and Case C-415/93, Union Royale Belge des Socie´te´s
de Football Association ASBL v. Jean-Marc Bosman, [1995] ECR I-4921 (in confirming that
non-discriminatory obstacles to free movement came within the scope of Art. 39 EC).
17. Again, in the “classic” vein, see Case 35–36/82, Morson and Jhanjan v. Netherlands,
[1982] ECR 3273, para 17 (“. . . no factor linking them with any of the situations governed by
Community law. . . ”) and Case C-332/90, Steen v. Deutsche Bundespost, [1992] ECR I-341,
para 9 (“. . . confined in all respects within a single Member State. . . ”).
18. Morson and Jhanjan, para 15.
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facts involve a “second” Member State at least.19 Moreover, the status of the
“receiving” (static) Member State nationals – and thus, the wholly internal
rule in itself – was considered by the Court not to have been affected by the
introduction of EU citizenship.20 On this point in Uecker and Jacquet, the
Court reasoned as follows:
“[C]itizenship of the Union . . . is not intended to extend the scope ratione
materiae of the Treaty also to internal situations which have no link with
Community law. Furthermore, Article [47] of the Treaty on European
Union provides that nothing in that Treaty is to affect the Treaties estab-
lishing the European Communities, subject to the provisions expressly
amending those treaties. Any discrimination which nationals of a Mem-
ber State may suffer under the law of that State fall within the scope of
that law and must therefore be dealt with within the framework of the
internal legal system of that State.”21
Another aspect of the wholly internal rule clarified subsequently is the con-
dition that the cross-border element in any given case must be real, not just
potential or hypothetical.22
The continuing ramifications of the Saunders legacy still generate a basic
analytical question – what exactly is reverse discrimination? Pickup takes
care to distinguish what he calls “harmonization discrimination”, i.e. “. . . the
discrimination which exists, in areas of Community law not yet subject to
harmonizing legislation, because different Member States have diverging
legislation.”23 The difference here, presumably, can be derived from the “not
yet” aspect of harmonization discrimination. So, for reverse discrimination
– which remains outwith the ambition of Community harmonization – is
it simply that “home” nationals are being discriminated against because of
their “home” nationality (a fairly ironic construction given the emphasis in
Community law generally on outlawing discrimination of this kind)? Or is it
not so much nationality that matters, as the mere act of movement? In Kaur,
Advocate General Le´ger remarked that “[t]he Court’s position in regard to
internal situations is justified by the need to confine application of the Treaty
provisions or the rules of secondary law resulting therefrom to situations
involving certain extraneous factors, in particular situations characterized by
19. See, in addition to Morson and Jhanjan, Joined Cases C-64 & 65/96, Land Nordrhein-
Westfalen v. Kari Uecker; Vera Jacquet v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1997] ECR I-3171 and
Joined Cases C-95, 98 & 180/99, Khalil and others, [2001] ECR I-7413.
20. See Uecker and Jacquet, paras. 19, 22–23.
21. Ibid., para 23. The questions raised by – or, perhaps, outstanding because of – this
interpretation will be discussed further in Section 3 below.
22. See Case 180/83, Moser v. Land Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, [1984] ECR 2539, para 18 and
Case C-299/95, Kremzow v. Austria, [1997] ECR I-2629, para 16.
23. Pickup, op. cit. supra note 8, 137.
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the existence of cross-border elements.”24 And, as the Court emphasized as
early as Knoors, it is perfectly possible for an individual to rely on EC law
against his or her own Member State once a cross-border element has been
generated in some way, so that the facts are not confined only to the home
State.25 Not all trans-frontier elements can successfully establish this link;26
the ways in which it can be achieved are discussed more fully in Section
3 but, as in Knoors itself, a fairly non-controversial possibility is that of
acquiring a professional qualification in another Member State.27 Even this
basic rule must be sited in the evolving character of ECJ case law, however,
by result of which, as submitted below, a link with Community law can be
established more easily yet more erratically; it was suggested by Advocate
General Fennelly in Angonese, for example, that study per se which does not
actually lead to a diploma or qualification might suffice to bring an individual’s
circumstances within the scope of the Treaty.28
Several commentators have addressed the character of reverse discrim-
ination from a more normative perspective. In particular, Cannizzaro has
suggested that the difference in treatment experienced here is “not necessar-
ily based on nationality” but that this is “most frequently the case”.29 He goes
on to outline the particular causal link between reverse discrimination and
overlapping or concurring systems of competence.30 And, connecting this
24. Case C-192/99, The Queen and Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte
Kaur, [2001] ECR I-1237, Opinion of A.G. Le´ger, para 24.
25. In Knoors, the Court, at para 24, reasoned as follows: “Although it is true that the
provisions of the Treaty relating to establishment and the provision of services cannot be
applied to situations which are purely internal to a Member State, the position nevertheless
remains that the reference in Article, [43] to ‘nationals of a Member State’ who wish to establish
themselves ‘in the territory of another Member State’ cannot be interpreted in such a way as
to exclude from the benefit of Community law a given Member State’s own nationals when
the latter, owing to the fact that they have lawfully resided on the territory of another Member
State and have there acquired a trade qualification which is recognized by the provisions of
Community law, are, with regard to their State of origin, in a situation which may be assimilated
to that of any other persons enjoying the rights and liberties guaranteed by the Treaty.” See also,
the Opinion of A.G. Reischl, especially at p. 416. Commenting on the principle emanating
from Knoors in a general sense, Pickup has described it as a “‘half-measure’, [which] irritates
as much as it soothes”, Pickup, op. cit. supra note 8, 154.
26. See note 1 supra.
27. See Case C-61/89, Criminal Proceedings against Bouchoucha, [1990] ECR I-3551,
Case C-19/92, Kraus v. Land Baden-Wu¨rttemberg, [1993] ECR I-1663 and Case C-234/97,
Ferna´ndez de Bobadilla v. Museo Nacional del Prado, [1999] ECR I-4773. In Joined Cases
C-225–227/95, Kapasakalis, Skiathitis and Kougiankas v. Greek State, [1998] ECR I-4239, the
Court confirmed that Directive 89/48 on the mutual recognition of qualifications (O.J. 1989, L
19/16) did not apply to purely internal situations.
28. See Angonese, Opinion of A.G. Fennelly, especially at paras. 28 and 33.
29. Cannizzaro, “Producing ‘reverse discrimination’ through the exercise of EC compet-
ences”, (1997) YEL, 29–46 at 29 (emphasis added).
30. Ibid., p. 33 et seq.
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with the adherence of the Court to movement as the bedrock of Article 39
EC, he suggests that:
“[i]t would be difficult to argue that the effectiveness of the EC right
of free movement of workers required a difference in the legal status
of foreign and national workers. . . Neither the Community norm nor the
national norm would appear unlawful if considered independently. . . In
other words, neither Community law nor national law intend to create a
discrimination. That is only the effect of the existence of two concurring
competences on the same subject.”31
Poiares Maduro echoes this reasoning, writing that “States do not, in general,
want to discriminate against their own nationals. Reverse discrimination nor-
mally occurs because EC law obliges States to treat nationals of other Member
States in a way which – by reasons of their own policies and aims – they did
not originally intend to treat their own nationals.”32 Viewed through this lens,
there is no element of blame involved, on the part of either the Community or
Member States. But what remains is the material difference in treatment; and
if this is to be redressed, then responsibility, at least, must be accepted at one
or both levels of Community governance. There is also a lingering incredulity
attached to the fact that without the stimulus of movement, an individual’s
situation can be so wholly different; as noted at the outset, it is precisely the
converse ease with which Community law can be triggered which sours the
logic of leaving the rest aside.
At this point, then, we can point to the origin and entrenchment of the wholly
internal rule; and yet already, there are some doubts as to its normative logic,
even before proceeding to examine the very significant extent to which EC law
on persons has matured. To sketch the boundaries of the internal market more
completely, however, it is first useful to consider the rules in respect of the
free movement of goods. There is no perfect conceptual symmetry across the
Community freedoms. Looking at goods and workers, non-discriminatory
obstacles to free movement do not necessarily infringe Article 28 EC, for
example, but this is not the case for Article 39;33 furthermore, Article 39
EC is horizontally directly effective, Article 28 is not (yet). But the wholly
internal rule does apply also in respect of goods, in the sense that intra-
Community trade must be at issue before the relevant Treaty provisions will
31. Ibid, p. 44.
32. Poiares Maduro, op. cit. supra note 8, p. 127.
33. Contrast the decision in Case C-267–268/91, Criminal Proceedings against Keck and
Mithouard, [1993] ECR I-6097 with Bosman, cited supra note 16, and Case C-190/98, Graf v.
Filmoser Maschinenbau GmbH, [2000] ECR I-493.
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bite.34 Here too, however, the persistence of the principle appears somewhat
less than secure.35 The authority usually cited here is Pistre, where the Court
(contrary to the Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, who held the circumstances to be
purely internal) reasoned that even where the facts of a case are confined
to a single Member State, the application of a national measure may effect
intra-Community trade where:
“. . . the measure in question facilitates the marketing of goods of domest-
ic origin to the detriment of imported goods [because] [i]n such cir-
cumstances, the application of the measure, even if restricted to domest-
ic producers, in itself creates and maintains a difference of treatment
between those two categories of goods, hindering, at least potentially,
intra-Community trade.”36
This statement stands alone in terms of its breadth, with the Court in sub-
sequent cases contriving its stance in terms of Article 234 EC.37 In explana-
tion, Oliver argues that the Court is not actually seeking to extend the scope
of Article 28 to situations which are purely internal to a Member State (which
he acknowledges would “fly in the face of the clear wording of the Treaty”38),
but is instead “. . . simply stating that it will not decline to answer a request
for a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of Article 28, even where the
inter-state element is lacking in the instant case.”39 He submits that this
34. For discussion of this point in the aftermath of Cassis, see Kon, op. cit. supra note 8, 91–
100 (Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentrale AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung fu¨r Branntwein (Cassis
de Dijon), [1979] ECR 649).
35. On reverse discrimination and Art. 28 EC in particular, see Oliver, “Some further
reflections on the scope of Articles 28–30 (ex 30–36) EC”, 36 CML Rev., 783–806 at 783–8.
36. Joined Cases C-321–24/94, Criminal Proceedings against Pistre, Barthes, Milhau and
Oberti, [1997] ECR I-2343. In the context of customs duties, the Court has been similarly keen
to avoid reverse discrimination: see esp. Joined Cases C-363, 407-11/93, Lancry v. Direction
Ge´ne´rale des Souanes and others, [1994] ECR I-3957, especially at paras. 25–31, including
the statement that “. . . the very principle of a customs union covers all trade in goods [and]
requires the free movement of goods generally, as opposed to inter-state trade alone, to be
ensured within the Union.” (para 29).
37. A.G. Jacobs also distinguished Pistre in his Opinion in Case C-312/98, Schutzverband
gegen Unwesen in der Wirtschaft eV v. Warsteiner Brauerei Haus Cramer GmbH & Co.
KG, [2000] ECR I-9087, at paras. 43–48, on the grounds that Pistre involved a “rather unusual
element” given that reverse discrimination was unlawful under national law, which thus allowed
the parties to rely (in an indirect way) on Art. 28 EC. This explanation certainly makes sense, but
the Court did not see necessary to invoke this “unusual element” in its eventual judgment. More
recently, see the Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Case C-159/00, Sapod Audic v. Eco-Emballages
SA, of 17 Jan. 2002, nyr, paras. 70–78. The point that reverse discrimination might be precluded
by national law is returned to in Section 4 below, in the context of remedies.
38. Oliver, op. cit. supra note 35, 787.
39. Ibid.
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approach was confirmed in the subsequent Foie Gras decision.40 But this
is a strategy that presents its own problems, problems which should not be
underestimated. In the context of workers, the Court adopted a similar logic
in Angonese, issuing its memorable declaration that Article 39(2) is horizont-
ally directly effective, but doing so in a case where the EC connection was
far from apparent.41 In its eagerness to provide answers to preliminary refer-
ences, even where an appreciable Community element is not likely to prove
substantive, the ECJ transfers a considerable burden to the national courts – if
the measure challenged is found to breach EC law, then it becomes more dif-
ficult to dismiss the proceedings at hand (especially, as occurred in Angonese,
if the Advocate General raises the possibility that an extension of EC law, so
bringing the applicant within the scope of the Treaty, might be conceivable).
This latter scenario positively invites further national references in respect
of the same cases, prolonging national proceedings both time-wise and fin-
ancially when the question secondly to the fore could really have been dealt
with first day. The catalytic character of ECJ judgments must also be borne
in mind here.42 The interaction between the ECJ and the national courts will
be considered again in Section 4, in terms of remedies; but first, the evolution
of EC law on persons will be explored more substantively.
40. Case C-184/96, Commission v. France, [1998] ECR I-6197, esp. at para 17. See also
Case C-448/98, Criminal Proceedings against Guimont, [2000] ECR I-10663, paras. 19–23,
and the discussion of this question by A.G. Saggio in particular, at paras. 6–8 (in contrast to
the Court, the A.G. did consider that the facts of the case were purely internal, proceeding to
address the substantive issue “just in case”).
41. Angonese, supra note 2; see also note by Lane and Nic Shuibhne, 37 CML Rev.,
1237–1247. More recently, in the context of the free movement of capital, see the decision
in Joined Cases C-515 etc./99, Reisch and others v. Bu¨rgermeister der Landeshauptstadt
Salzburg and ors, 5 March 2002, nyr, especially at paras. 20–27; the Court draws directly from
its reasoning in Angonese and Guimont, notwithstanding the very clear statement that the facts
of the present case were undisputedly confined to a single Member State (in para 24). The
Angonese preliminary reference reasoning has taken root also in respect of external relations
(Case C-33/99, Hassan Fahmi and M. Esmoris Cerdeiro-Pinedo Amado v. Bestuur van de
Sociale Verzekeringsbank, [2001] ECR I-2415) and environmental protection (Case C-510/99,
Criminal Proceedings against Tridon, [2001] ECR I-7777).
42. On this point, in the context of goods, see Steyger, National Traditions and European
Community Law: Margarine and Marriage (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997), p. 234, which
includes the observation that: “It is not that easy to adjust the laws on goods partially, and only
to impose different, usually lower, requirements on imported products, while continuing to
impose higher standards on domestic products. Though in many situations the Member States
are allowed to do so, they adjust their legislation completely, nevertheless.”
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3. The middle: Eroding the entrenchment
The thread running through this section is that of expansion – of progression,
development and intensifying integration; three thematic divisions can, how-
ever, be made. First, the latitude attached to the concept of the Community
worker in ECJ case law will be considered in a fairly general sense, intro-
ducing the idea that, notwithstanding the limitations of Saunders, the reality
of establishing a cross-border element is not overly problematic. Second, the
particular repercussions – both actual and prospective – of the Court’s judg-
ment in Singh will be considered. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the
ongoing judicial shading of EU citizenship will be addressed.
3.1. The scope of Article 39 EC: More “almost external” than wholly
internal?
The typically generous approach of the ECJ to the definitional scope of
Community workers is well established.43 What concerns us here, however,
is the more subtle liberality of the Court in determining that a given situation
satisfies the cross-border dimension of that concept. As Pickup observed, well
before EU citizenship or even the decision in Singh, the need to establish a
connecting factor with Community law is “. . . an arbitrary distinction begging
the question of what degree of connection is required.”44 Notably, he cautions
that since this is a question of fact to be determined by national courts, there
may be varying standards across the Member States, a point returned to in
Section 4 in the context of remedies.
Overwhelmingly, the case law of the Court exhibits the movement thes-
is (rather than the “home discrimination” one); nationality of a Member
State remains critical, but Article 39 – and, crucially, its derivative secondary
legislation – can be relied on against an individual’s home State so long as
there exists some cross-border element from which to draw. For example, in
Scholz, the plaintiff, of German origin but having acquired Italian nationality
by marriage and residing in Italy, was deemed to come within the scope of
Article 39 in respect of an employment competition for posts at an Italian
university; the Court felt that “[a]ny Community national who, irrespective of
his place of residence and his nationality, has exercised the right to freedom
43. The archetypal authorities here include Case 66/85, Lawrie-Blum v. Land Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg, [1986] ECR 2121 (general definition of worker), Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatsse-
cretaris van Justitie, [1982] ECR 1035 (part-time work), Case 196/87, Steymann v. Staatsse-
cretaris van Justitie, [1988] ECR 6159 (remuneration) and Case C-292/89, R. v. Immigration
Appeal Tribunal ex parte Antonissen, [1991] ECR I-745 (job-seekers).
44. Pickup, op. cit. supra note 8, 156 (emphasis added).
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of movement for workers and who has been employed in another Member
State, falls within the scope of [the non-discrimination principle in Article
39 EC and Regulation 1612/68].”45 In Terhoeve, the Court confirmed that
“. . . Article [39 EC] and Article 7 of Regulation 1612/68 may be relied on
by a worker against the Member State of which he is a national where he
has resided and been employed in another Member State.”46 As is clearer
from the decision in Scholz, employment per se, even without residence, in
another Member State is what appears to be material (as discovered by Mr
Werner in the context of establishment47). The judgment in Boukhalfa readily
supports this interpretation;48 here, it was decided that Article 39 EC (and the
relevant provisions of Regulation 1612/68) applied to a Member State (Bel-
gian) national resident in a non-member country (Algiers). The connecting
factor with Community law was satisfied here because she was employed by
another Member State (Germany) in its embassy in the non-member country,
and her contract of employment was governed by German law. Thus, she was
not actually required to have resided (or even ever been) in the employing
Member State at any point. This generates an arguably slender connection to
Community law, or, at least, a fairly creative one. The Court has also been gen-
erous to frontier workers, who reside in their home State but, crucially, work
(or are established) in another, by characterizing the considerable potential of
“social and tax advantages” (Art. 7(2) of Regulation 1612/68) as somewhat
“exportable”.49
In the context of social security, the wholly internal rule applies equally to
situations coming within the scope of Regulation 1408/71.50 But, once again,
the scope for manoeuvre within the parameters of the limitation is ample.
For example, in Kulzer, a German national who lived and worked in his own
Member State was held to come within the scope of Regulation 1408/71 in
45. Case C-419/92, Scholz v. Opera Universitaria di Cagliari and Cinzia Porcedda, [1994]
ECR I-505, para 9 (Regulation 1612/68 O.J. 1968 Sp. Ed. L 257/2, p. 475).
46. Case C-18/95, FC Terhoeve v. Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst Particulier-
en/Ondernemingen Buitenland, [1999] ECR I-345, para 29.
47. See note 1 supra, and Section 4 below; cf. the decisions in Case C-279/93, Finanzamt
Ko¨ln-Altstadt v. Schumacker, [1995] ECR I-225 and Case C-80/94, Wielockx v. Inspecteur der
Directe Belastingen, [1995] ECR I-2493.
48. Case C-214/94, Boukhalfa v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [1996] ECR I-2253, esp. at
para 22.
49. See Case C-57/96, Meints v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, [1997]
ECR I-6689, paras. 49–50 and Case C-337/97, Meeusen v. Hoofddirectie van de Informatie
Beheer Groep, [1999] ECR I-3289, paras. 25 (workers) and 30 (self-employed persons). The
facts in Meeusen concerned the award of a study grant, an aspect of Community law now
enmeshed with EU citizenship: see the landmark decision of the Court in Case C-184/99,
Grzelczyk v. Centre public d’aide sociale d’Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, [2001] ECR I-6193,
discussed below.
50. O.J. 1971, L 149/2 (as amended); see Case C-153/91, Petit v. Office national des
pensions, [1992] ECR I-4973, para 10; this was confirmed in Khalil, para 71.
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the context of family benefits, the requisite cross-border requirement being
fulfilled by the fact that his daughter lived in France.51 The personal scope of
the Regulation has been addressed most recently in Humer; here, the Court
cited Kulzer with approval, confirming that the “cross-border nexus” may
legitimately be established by residence of the relevant (dependant) family
member – and not necessarily the worker him/herself – in another Member
State.52 In particular, the Court pointed out that the purpose of Articles 73
and 74 of the Regulation is
“. . . precisely to guarantee members of the family residing in a Mem-
ber State other than the competent State the grant of the family benefits
provided for by the applicable legislation. . . . [T]hose articles are inten-
ded to prevent Member States from making entitlement to and the mount
of family benefits dependent on residence of the members of the work-
er’s family in the Member State providing the benefits, so that Com-
munity workers are not deterred from exercising their right to freedom of
movement. . . .”53
In Khalil, the Spanish Government had contended that the decision in Kulzer
was so broad as to remove the need for any “cross-border nexus” at all
– a reading deemed incorrect, however, by the Advocate General and not
discussed at all by the Court.54
Finally, the Court has also addressed the degree to which an individual’s
status as a migrant worker is retained after the employment relationship has
ended. The particular questions thrown up in Singh are discussed separately
below, but there are some more general principles at play here also. In Meints,
for example, the Court, drawing from its earlier decision in Lair,55 held that
“. . . migrant workers are guaranteed certain rights linked to the status of
worker even when they are no longer in an employment relationship.”56 In
Leclere and Deaconescu, the Court consolidated its reasoning, stating that
a former worker “. . . continues to be entitled to certain advantages acquired
by virtue of his employment relationship; the principle of equal treatment
requires that he be able to enjoy those advantages without any condition that
51. Case C-194/96, Kulzer v. Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR I-895.
52. Case C-255/99 Humer, judgment of 5 Feb. 2002, nyr, para 48.
53. Ibid, paras. 39–40, citing Case C-12/89, Gatto, [1989] ECR I-557, summary publication,
and Joined Cases C-245 & 312/94, Hoever and Zachow, [1996] ECR I-4895 at para 34. The
“deterrent” aspect of this extract is especially relevant given the decision in Singh and is
discussed further below.
54. See the Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Khalil, at para 66 et seq.
55. Case 39/86, Lair v. Universita¨t Hannover, [1988] ECR 3161, para 36.
56. Meints, para 40; see also Case C-85/96, Martı´nez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, [1998] ECR
I-2691, para 32.
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he reside in the territory of the competent Member State.”57 The Court noted
expressly, however, that new rights, having no connection to the person’s
former occupation, cannot be acquired under EC law; any lingering rights
must be derived from the professional activity previously undertaken.58 The
beneficial implications of this for family members of the worker were seen
as early, for example, as Moritz;59 but the limitations to the principle –
highlighting the Court’s warning that no “new” rights can be created – were
to the fore more recently in Fahmi.60
Overall, the case law discussed in this section indicates that while the basic
premise of the wholly internal rule still holds sway, considerable dents have
been made in its effect because of the broad scope attributed to Article 39
EC and its implementing legislation. Again, however, this begs the question
of circumstances deemed not to trigger the vital connecting factor seeming
arbitrarily construed or excluded. Against this general backdrop, the particular
implications of the decision in Singh – which have since been, and indeed are
poised still to be, brought to fruition – will now be outlined.
3.2. A door ajar? The decision in Singh
The basic premise of Singh can be linked, in the first instance, to an issue
introduced already above – to what extent can a shield of EC protection
still attach even after a worker has returned to his/her home Member State?
Specifically in this case, the third country national (Indian) spouse of a British
national was able to employ Community law to derive a right of residence in
the United Kingdom, on the basis that his spouse had previously exercised
her right to free movement (and been accompanied there by her spouse).
The Court of Justice reaffirmed the need for the applicant to establish a
connection between his circumstances and Community law; but the link
ultimately accepted marks something of an advance – a welcome advance in
terms of providing the greatest degree of protection possible for individuals,
but an arguably dubious one from the perspectives of coherence and of the
questions provoked rather than answered by the judgment.
The applicant was challenging a (national) decision that refused him leave
to remain indefinitely in the United Kingdom.61 Mrs Singh had exercised
57. Case C-43/99, Leclere and Deaconescu v. Caisse nationale des prestations familiales,
[2001] ECR I-4265, para 58.
58. Ibid., paras. 59 and 61.
59. Cases 389 & 390/87, Echternach and Moritz v. Netherlands Ministry for Education and
Science, [1989] ECR 723.
60. See Case C-33/99, Hassan Fahmi and M. Esmoris Cerdeiro-Pinedo Amado v. Bestuur
van de Sociale Verzekeringsbank, [2001] ECR I-2415.
61. The decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal hinged on the fact that the Singhs
were about to be divorced; a decree nisi of divorce had been pronounced at the material time,
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her Treaty right to work in another Member State and was accompanied
there by her husband (in accordance with Directive 68/36062). Both returned
subsequently to the United Kingdom where Mrs Singh re-established herself
(in her own Member State) as a self-employed person within the meaning
of Article 43 EC; the question being considered by the Court of Justice was
whether her husband could enjoy a right of residence with her in the UK in
accordance with Directive 73/148.63 The United Kingdom argued strongly
that, at this point in time, the Singhs’ situation was back within the competence
of the national authorities, but the ECJ responded as follows:
“[T]his case is concerned not with a right under national law but with the
rights of movement and establishment granted to a Community national by
Articles [39 and 43] of the Treaty. These rights cannot be fully effective if
such a person may be deterred from exercising them by obstacles raised in
his or her own country of origin to the entry and residence of her spouse.
Accordingly, when a Community national who has availed himself or
herself of those rights returns to his or her country of origin, his or her
spouse must enjoy at least the same rights of entry and residence as would
be granted to him or her under Community law if his or her spouse chose
to enter and reside in another Member State.”64
The Court here frowns on policies which yield a deterrent national climate,
biased against the exercise of Treaty rights. Would its answer have been
different had the couple not been self-employed within the meaning (for Mrs
Singh) of Article 43 EC on their return to the United Kingdom? The fact that
both Articles 39 and 43 EC were relevant to their situation (albeit at different
times) seems, in a cumulative sense, to be significant and both provisions
were conjoined by the Court in Singh; but that does not necessarily presage
a situation involving, for example, workers only. It is true that Article 43
contains a possible textual loophole, in that it refers merely to “establishment
of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State”,
which could arguably cover Mrs. Singh’s returning from Germany to the
United Kingdom;65 but the Court did not hinge its decision on, or even raise,
this point.
It is instead the requirement of movement – even at some point in the past
– which is stressed overall. And significantly, Advocate General Tesauro felt
with the marriage subsequently dissolved. But for the period of time under consideration in
respect of the Art. 234 reference, the Singhs were considered by the ECJ still to be lawfully
married (see para 12).
62. JO 1968 L 257/13.
63. O.J. 1973, L 172/14.
64. Singh, paras. 23–4.
65. On this point, see Auer, para 20 et seq.; cf. the Opinion of A.G. Warner at 455. See more
recently, the decision in Kraus, cited supra note 27.
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that there was nothing “paradoxical or illogical” about the fact that someone
who could not demonstrate a connection with Community law would be
required to leave his/her Member State in order to activate Community law
rights (here, of entry and residence).66 Cannizzaro takes quite a different
view of things, however. He finds it “difficult to perceive the rationale of
a solution that would impose restraints on Member States in the treatment
of some citizens only, depending on a very formal element, like that of
having once – and perhaps in a situation unconnected with the case at stake
– availed themselves of the rights and freedoms of the Treaty.”67 In the first
place, the emphasis in Singh on the need to avoid discouraging the exercise
of Community rights does not really fit with the (arguably more specific)
needs of resettled workers after returning to their home States. But two linked
considerations remain more dangerously unclear: first, the threshold at which
it will be accepted that a Community right has been (sufficiently) exercised
and, second, the extent to which it will be held to have a bearing on the
circumstances that come subsequently before the Court.68
And, inevitably, the question arises: if the logic of Singh is potentially infin-
ite, how can it be said that movement retains any credibility as a prerequisite
at all? Johnson and O’Keeffe remarked that the next step in a post-Singh
mood was that “. . . even those Community nationals who have never exer-
cised freedom of movement could still challenge national rules which were
incompatible with the spirit of free movement envisaged by the Treaty as
being deterrents to mobility.”69 Perhaps just one step behind this hypothesis,
the very least that an individual is required to do/move in order to activate
66. Singh, Opinion of A.G. Tesauro, para 15.
67. He goes on to say “If we apply this argument, we must conclude that a subject who
has exercised the right to free movement and worked abroad for a certain time will enjoy,
once back in his home country, every right afforded by EC law relating to free movement.
This conclusion could be justified only by a need to provide citizens of the national state with
minimal standards in order to allow them to come back and stay in their home country on a
basis of equality with foreign workers. But if we adopt this line of reasoning, there is logically
no ground for excluding from the enjoyment of the same provisions those citizens who never
exercised the right of free movement. . . .” Cannizzaro, op. cit. supra note 29, 43 (emphasis
added).
68. Lane and Nic Shuibhne have framed the dilemma as follows: “There was a fair and fairly
apparent Community element in the Singhs’ adventures: they had lived and worked together
(so exercising a Treaty right) in Germany and they co-owned the undertaking established in the
UK (although they were in the final throes of a divorce). But how far can the principle extend?
Has a Belgian who went on holiday to Crete 15 years ago, or from time to time watches TF1
on cable television – both involving the exercise of a Community right – earned the right to
invoke Articles 39 or 43 and their attendant legislation in Belgium?”, Lane and Nic Shuibhne,
op. cit. supra note 41, 1242.
69. Johnson and O’Keeffe, “From discrimination to obstacles to free movement: Recent
developments concerning the free movement of workers 1989–1994”, 31 CML Rev., 1313–
1346 at 1338.
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Community rights is what, in essence, calls now to be clarified in Carpenter,
currently pending before the Court and discussed in Section 4 below.70 And
even the plausible, if radical, follow-on sketched by Johnson and O’Keeffe is
not so remote as might be assumed (again, discussed in Section 4, in light of
recent Commission proposals).
In the specific domain of residence claims, the potential for abuse – thinking
particularly of marriages of convenience and of brief stays in other Member
States with the intention purely of generating a shield of Community rights
upon return – was highlighted in Singh by the UK government. These argu-
ments were accorded legitimacy by the Advocate General; but both he, and
ultimately the Court, did not feel that the concern was sufficiently grave to
justify a more restrictive result overall.71 Despite the reassurances of the
Court, this must surely involve sensitive inquiries at national level; and, call-
ing into question the comforts offered by Singh, the Immigration Appeal
Tribunal has recently referred more direct questions on this point to the Court
of Justice.72 Some cautioning against a broad application of Singh could be
implied from Advocate General Fennelly’s remarks in Angonese, in his obser-
vation that “. . . short educational exchanges or even periods of as little as one
day spent abroad as a tourist could, quite arbitrarily, enable a person to invoke
70. Case C-60/00, Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, pending; the
Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl was delivered on 13 Sept. 2001.
71. Singh, para 24, which states that “. . . the facilities created by the Treaty cannot have
the effect of allowing the persons who benefit from them to evade the application of national
legislation and of prohibiting Member States from taking the measures necessary to prevent
such abuse.” (citing para 25 of Knoors and para 14 of Bouchoucha) See also, the Opinion of
A.G. Tesauro, para 14. On the submissions of the UK government, and the significance of the
fact that they ultimately failed, see White, “A fresh look at reverse discrimination”, 18 EL Rev.
(1993), 527–532.
72. Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Hacene Akrich, pending
(see O.J. 2001, C 150/12). The questions referred are: “Where a national of a Member State
is married to a third country national who does not qualify under national legislation to enter
or reside in that Member State, and moves to another Member State with the non-national
spouse, intending to exercise Community law rights by working there for only a limited period
of time in order thereafter to claim the benefit of Community law rights when returning to the
Member State of nationality together with the non-national spouse: (1) is the Member State
of nationality entitled to regard the intention of the couple, when moving to the other Member
State, to claim the benefit of Community law rights when returning to the Member State
of nationality, notwithstanding the non-national spouse’s lack of qualification under national
legislation, as a reliance on Community law in order to evade the application of national
legislation; and (2) if so, is the Member State of nationality entitled to refuse: a) to revoke any
preliminary obstacle to the entry of the non-national spouse into that Member State (on the
facts of this case an outstanding deportation order); and b) to accord the non-national spouse
a right of entry into its territory?” In the context of non-binding guidelines, see the Council
Resolution on measures to be adopted on the combating of marriages of convenience, 1997
O.J. C/382/1.
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Community-law rights against his own Member State.”73 So it would seem
necessary that some degree of connection between the rights enjoyed abroad
and those claimed upon return could be established – mirroring the approach
seen above in Meints, Leclere and Deaconescu and Fahmi. But this was not
addressed directly by the Court – either in Singh or in Angonese.74 And it
is arguable equally that drawing a line under the activation of Community
rights at the point implied by Advocate General Fennelly is itself “arbitrary”,
especially when the breadth attached to the provision and receipt of services
in Bickel and Franz75 and the case law on citizenship (discussed below) are
brought into the equation. It is precisely the scope of services that falls now to
be refined in Carpenter. But, as White remarked in the immediate aftermath
of Singh, the potential impact of that judgment on reverse discrimination
and the wholly internal rule has become all the more urgent in light of EU
citizenship;76 and so, the extent to which the interim passage of time has
proved him all the more prophetic will first be addressed.
3.3. A door (almost) open: The developing scope of EU citizenship
The introduction and initial development of the EC Treaty citizenship provi-
sions are well documented.77 But the key judgments in this context, Martı´nez
Sala, Bickel and Franz, Wijsenbeek78 and Grzelczyk, can be as frustratingly
vague as they are illuminating. It is not the intention here simply to describe
these cases in a general sense. But, as noted at the outset, the fundamental
regulatory shift effected by citizenship strongly challenges the legitimacy of
maintaining the wholly internal rule; in particular, it highlights both the deep-
ening consequences of movement and the potentially inferior position of those
who stay still. As will become clear, however, the implications of citizenship
are not yet straightforward or complete, thinking broadly of the persisting
73. Angonese, Opinion of A.G. Fennelly, para 9 (emphasis added).
74. In Singh, A.G. Tesauro did raise this question – see para 5 of his Opinion in particular, in
which he discusses the need to establish a “logical nexus” between the exercise of movement
and the rights on which the worker seeks subsequently to rely. But the extent to which his
comments remain valid in light of recent case law on citizenship – which has arguably severed
the “logical nexus” between personal and material scope – is discussed in Section 3.3.2. below.
75. Case C-274/96, Criminal Proceedings against Bickel and Franz, [1998] ECR I-7637
(esp. at para, 15; see also the Opinion of A.G. Jacobs, paras. 16–21).
76. White, op. cit. supra note 71, 532.
77. See esp. O’Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free
Movement of Persons to Union Citizenship (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1996);
Fries and Shaw, “Citizenship of the Union: First steps in the European Court of Justice”, 4
EPL (1998), 533–559; O’Leary, “Putting flesh on the bones of European Union citizenship”,
24 EL Rev. (1999), 68–79; and Toner, “Judicial interpretation of European Union citizenship
– Transformation or consolidation?”, 7 MJ (2000), 158–182.
78. Case C-378/97, Criminal Proceedings against Wijsenbeek, [1999] ECR I-6207.
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ambiguity surrounding Article 18(1) EC and the balance that requires still to
be struck between its potential and limitations.
3.3.1. Framing EU Citizenship: Thou Shalt Move
The initial criterion of access to EU citizenship is that of nationality. Basically,
an individual must have the nationality of any of the Member States – the
determination of which remains within national competence79 – before the
panorama of EU citizenship can open up. The second criterion is movement.80
Drawing from case law on Article 39 EC, it has already been argued that the
requirement of movement can be relatively undemanding in reality; in the
domain of citizenship, the decisions in Bickel and Franz and Wijsenbeek have
lessened this burden all the more. Both cases relate primarily to one key aspect
of citizenship: the right to move within the territory of the Member States,
the realization of which does not drain Member State reserves (financial
and otherwise) to anything like the extent implied by the altogether more
comprehensive right of residence. Despite the prescriptive phrasing at the
beginning of Article 18(1) EC – “Every citizen of the Union shall have the
right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. . . ”
(reproduced in Art. 45(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights) – Toner
remarks on the residual nature of citizenship in the early case law of the
Court.81 The alternative, though expansive, interpretation of services in Bickel
is classically illustrative here.82 In Wijsenbeek, the Court seemed more open
to exploiting the potential of Article 18(1) without needing the crutch of
another Treaty freedom;83 and in this way, given the facts of the case, the
Court distilled the requirement of movement down to its purest form: if you
cross a border, you activate EC law and, more precisely, the principle of
equal treatment – it truly seemed as simple as that, with no discussion of
economic activity of any kind or even of any meaningful connection between
79. In general terms, this reserved power does not seem to have been eroded, but Hall traces
something of a Community intrusion into this supposedly reserved domestic competence: Hall,
“Loss of Union citizenship in breach of fundamental rights”, 21 EL Rev. (1996), 129–143; see
Case 21/74, Airola v. Commission, [1975] ECR 221, paras. 10–11 and Case C-369/90, Mario
Vicente Micheletti and others v. Delegacio´n del Gobierno en Cantabria, [1992] ECR I-4239,
para 10. The activist approach evident in these decisions contrasts, however, with the more
qualified interpretation in Kaur (see esp. paras. 22–26).
80. Excepting Art. 21 EC (right to petition the European Parliament, apply to the European
Ombudsman and write to the EC institutions (and receive a reply) in any of the languages
mentioned in Art. 314 EC).
81. Toner, op. cit. supra note 77, 172–3; she draws attention also to the reticence of the
Court when compared with the more ambitious opinions of some of its advocates general (see
174–5).
82. See note 75 supra; essentially, the Court created an interpretation via which almost any
cross-border activity could involve the receipt of services and come, as a result, within the
scope of the EC law principle of equal treatment.
83. Wijsenbeek, esp. at paras. 22 and 41.
750 Nic Shuibhne CML Rev. 2002
the individual (or his/her circumstances) and the host Member State. The
mere presence of an EU citizen in any Member State other than his/her own
thus generates, at least, a basic obligation of equal treatment vis-a`-vis the
host State’s own nationals (the actual extent of which being something of
another matter, however, as discussed immediately below); but the presence
of that citizen in his/her own Member State per se does not generate any
EC obligations at all, outwith the specific contexts of sex discrimination and
Article 21 EC (and the rules on competition law).
3.3.2. Taking things further: Exploring (and limiting) residence
The case law relating to residence rights – notably Martı´nez Sala and Grzel-
czyk – is tied more to the second phrase of Article 18(1) (“. . . subject to
the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the measures
adopted to give it effect”) and, more specifically, to the conditions for law-
ful residence in another Member State laid down in the so-called residence
directives i.e. adequate sickness insurance and sufficient resources to avoid
becoming a burden on the social assistance system of the host Member State.84
But a live issue before the Court of Justice at present is the extent to which
a state must take responsibility for the nationals of other EC Member States
resident in their territories – not, as was traditionally the case, because of the
individual’s status as a worker or self-employed person, but in a more human
capacity, because of the status of citizenship. In Martı´nez Sala, the entitlement
of a Spanish national residing in Germany to a child-raising allowance, on
the same footing as German nationals, was derived directly from her status as
an EU citizen, notwithstanding the fact that she was drawing from German
social security; in Grzelczyk, a French national studying in Belgium was, as
an EU citizen, found to be entitled to a national social assistance payment,
again on the same basis as Belgian nationals. How were these applicants
able to bring their circumstances within the scope of the Treaty when both
were clearly outside what might be termed its financial scope, being patently
without “sufficient resources”? In other words, to what do the “conditions
and limitations” in Article 18(1) actually refer?
In their submissions to the Court, many of the Member States have protested
at one time or another – largely, “. . . motivated by the fear of excessive
influxes of unemployed persons towards more generous social assistance
schemes. . . ”85 – that Article 18(1) was not intended to confer any new rights
84. See Directive 90/364, O.J. 1990, L 180/26, Art. 1(1); Directive 90/365, O.J. 1990, L
180/28, Art. 1(1); and Directive 93/96, O.J. 1993, L 317/59, Art. 1. In Wijsenbeek, the Court
did address the fact that limitations may also be attached, legitimately, to the right simply to
move to other States (see paras. 41–45).
85. Toner, op. cit. supra note 77, 165.
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of movement and/or residence.86 But the sum of the four key citizenship
judgments does, at least, indicate that EC law has moved somewhat beyond
the labels of work, establishment and services, severing a very fundamental
connection between the personal and material scope of the Treaty.87 It is this
construction that might lead us to revisit the case of Mr Werner; as O’Leary
has observed, “[q]uite apart from his involvement in an economic activity in
his MS of origin, he was exercising his constitutional right to reside in a MS
other than his own pursuant to Article [18].”88 Moreover, the Commission
is likely to propose significant expansion (or arguably, codification) of the
scope of “social and tax advantages” in the context of reforming Regulation
1612/68.89 In any event, it seems clear that Article 18(1) cannot be limited by
the Treaty (and secondary legislation) provisions governing movement and
residence in the context of economic activity. The continuing point of debate
hinges on the more general limitations found in the residence directives and,
specifically, on the criteria of sickness insurance and sufficient resources.
The directives pre-date the introduction of EU citizenship, but they do relate
to non-economic movement and residence; can they continue to limit the
movement and residence rights generated by Article 18(1)?
Only the Court of First Instance has dealt with this question head-on.
In Kucklenz-Winter, it held that what was then Article 8a EC was, as is
clearly evident from the wording of the provision, subject to limitations
and conditions; critically, the Court referred “in particular” to the residence
directive criteria.90 The Court of Justice, on the other hand, has been expressly
86. These efforts persisted even after Martı´nez Sala (see esp. para 22 of Grzelczyk); see
also, the discussion by A.G. Geelhoed in Case C-413/99, Baumbast and R v. Secretary of State
for the Home Department, pending, Opinion delivered on 5 July 2001, especially at para 96
et seq. and discussed in section 4 below. In terms of the national courts, Toner (op. cit. supra
note 77, 163) refers e.g. to R v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Vitale,
[1996] All ER (EC) 461, in which the English Court of Appeal felt that it was so obvious that
the residence directive conditions still applied, the question did not even merit a reference to
the ECJ.
87. See, in particular, Martı´nez Sala, paras. 61–64.
88. O’Leary, The Evolving. . . , op. cit. supra note 77, p. 277.
89. In 1998, the Commission did present a proposal for amendment of Regulation 1612/68
(O.J. 1998 C 344/7) but it was never discussed by the Council; at the hearing in Baumbast, the
Commission stated that a new proposal in this vein was “circulating in its departments” (see the
Opinion of A.G. Geelhoed, para 30). In its earlier proposal, the Commission extended coverage
of Art. 7(2) to “financial, fiscal, social, cultural and other advantages”. On one argument,
however, this may simply reflect the breadth already accorded to the existing provision in the
case law.
90. Case T-66/95, Hedwig Kuchlenz-Winter v. Commission, [1997] ECR II-637, para 47.
The sickness insurance, rather than sufficient resources, condition was under consideration in
this particular case. The applicant’s appeal (Case C-228/97, [1998] ECR I-6047 was dismissed
by the ECJ by order, as manifestly inadmissible and unfounded (essentially, no new arguments
were considered to have been raised).
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evasive on the same point. In Martı´nez Sala, the Court (probably with some
relief) pointed out that “. . . in a case such as the present, it is not necessary to
examine whether the person concerned can rely on Article [18 EC] in order
to obtain a new right to reside in the territory of the Member State concerned,
since it is common ground that she has already been authorized to reside
there, although she has been refused a residence permit.”91 In other words,
Mrs Martı´nez Sala’s (nationally accepted) lawful residence in Germany was
taken as a starting point for the application of equal treatment; the Court
did not assess whether she could derive any residence rights per se from the
citizenship provisions and, therefore, did not have to address substantively
the fact that she did not have sufficient resources – or even, whether this was
even still relevant, a matter upon which some doubt was cast by Advocate
General La Pergola:
“That legislation was adopted by the Council to cover situations in which
citizens did not enjoy a right of residence under other provisions of Com-
munity law. Now, however, we have Article [18] of the Treaty. The right
to move and reside freely throughout the whole of the Union is enshrined
in an act of primary law and does not exist or cease to exist depending on
whether or not it has been made subject to limitations under other provi-
sions of Community law, including secondary legislation. The limitations
provided for in Article [18] itself concern the actual exercise but not the
existence of the right. Directive 90/364 continues to regulate, if at all, the
conditions governing enjoyment of the freedom of movement laid down
in the Treaty.”92
The result achieved in Wijsenbeek reflects this logic; yes, Article 18(1) confers
a right of free movement, but one subject to some limitations. And yet, the
basic question remains: what limitations exactly? The recent decision in
Grzelczyk seems to compound rather than relieve the uncertainty. Here, as
noted above, a French student studying in Belgium was found (in his fourth
year of study) to be entitled to receipt of a minimum subsistence allowance
paid by the Belgian State (the “minimex”), on the basis that students of
Belgian nationality were so entitled. It had already been decided that the
minimex constituted a social advantage within the meaning of Regulation
1612/68;93 and, of course, it was no longer necessary, since Martı´nez Sala,
actually to be a worker for that purpose. More than in Martı´nez Sala, however,
the Court had to confront the limitations of citizenship in Grzelczyk. Once
91. Martı´nez Sala, para 60; the applicant’s right to reside in Germany stemmed from
Germany’s obligations under the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance
(1953; see paras. 11, and 13–14 of the judgment).
92. Martı´nez Sala, Opinion of A.G. La Pergola, para 18 (emphasis added).
93. Grzelczyk, para 27, citing Case 249/83, Hoeckx v. Openbaar Centrum voor Maatschap-
pelijk Welzijn Kalmthout, [1985] ECR 973.
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again, the applicant no longer satisfied the sufficient resources condition laid
down in (for his purposes, as a student) Directive 93/96; moreover, Article
3 of that Directive states expressly that the Directive does not “. . . establish
any entitlement to the payment of maintenance grants by the host Member
State on the part of students benefiting from the right of residence.” The
Court reflected, somewhat lyrically, that “Union citizenship is destined to
be the fundamental status of nationals of the Member States, enabling those
who find themselves in the same situation to enjoy the same treatment in
law irrespective of their nationality.”94 In a passage of striking simplicity,
the Court then remarked that while Article 3 of Directive 93/96 does not
establish an entitlement to maintenance grants, “. . . there are no provisions
. . . that preclude those to whom it applies from receiving such benefits.”95
But somehow, the parts of Grzelczyk do not add up to a very coherent
whole; if it is accepted that a right of residence for students can be derived
from the Treaty, as confirmed by the Court in Lair, that right was then codified
– as opposed to created – by Directive 93/96. But if citizenship transcends the
need to come within the scope of the Treaty ratione personae in any particular
capacity in the first place, then why is it that the Court still addresses Directive
93/96 at all? Moreover, the way in which the sufficient resources condition
is addressed in substantive terms is more fudged than reasoned; it is difficult
to decipher the Court’s reasoning here and to determine exactly when non-
satisfaction of the sufficient resources condition could actually cause a right
of residence to be withdrawn.96 A special distinction seems also to have been
drawn for the category of EU citizens who are students, but this doesn’t really
fit with the “fundamental status” of all free movers the Court had earlier
extolled.
Advocate General Alber does refer to an alternative way of looking at
citizenship, submitted, in Grzelczyk, by the Portuguese Government:
“Citizenship of the Union took on greater significance, in contrast to the
perception of individuals as purely economic factors which had underlain
the EC Treaty. The conditions on which freedom of movement may depend
are now no longer economic in nature, as they still were in the 1990
directives. The only ‘limitations and conditions’ attached to freedom of
movement now are those imposed on grounds of public policy, public
security and public health.”97
94. Grzelczyk, para 31, the Court here presumably realizing a beyond work/establishment/
services ethos, and not one that calls for the erosion of national status and nationality per se.
95. Ibid., para 39; see also, the Opinion of A.G. Alber, para 109. In this context, the Court
noted (paras. 34–5) that the citizenship provisions have very probably reversed the Court’s
earlier position in Case 197/86, Brown v. Secretary of State for Scotland, [1988] ECR 3205.
96. Grzelczyk, paras. 40–45.
97. Ibid., Opinion of A.G. Alber, para 52.
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Of course, taking that argument to its logical conclusion, even the grounds
specified in that passage might not necessarily/automatically apply, tied, as
they currently are, to the exercise of economic activity. But the essential
premise is that the residence directives, pre-dating a right enshrined in the
Treaty, cannot limit that subsequent right; any “limitations and conditions”
envisaged at Maastricht must be enacted on the basis of or directed specifically
at Article 18(1) itself. This, quite simply, did not happen, and the implications
of the legal vacuum existing in the interim – which generates completely
unfettered rights of movement and residence – are simply enormous from the
perspective of the Member States, especially, but not exclusively, in financial
terms. But surely the Portuguese interpretation makes more legal sense? At
the very least, it certainly provides yet another opportunity to reflect on what
EU citizenship should mean.98
3.3.3. What the Commission did next?
The Commission has recently tabled proposals that attempt both to clarify
and develop the right to reside in another Member State.99 Stemming from
the 1998 recommendations of the high-level panel on the free movement
of persons,100 the Commission has proposed inter alia a sweeping revision
which would replace the present sectoral and contextually specific legislative
framework with a single set of rules on freedom of movement for all cit-
izens of the Union and their families – irrespective of the purpose for which
they have moved to another Member State and, at least in terms of being
contained in a single legal instrument, irrespective of the nature (i.e. eco-
nomic or otherwise) of that purpose.101 The rationale behind this approach is
drawn from the “. . . new legal and political environment established by cit-
izenship of the Union.”102 The proposed directive does distinguish between
economic and non-economic activity by retaining the sickness insurance and
sufficient resources criteria for the latter; however, it confines these restric-
tions to the first four years of residence in the host State and, thereafter, seeks
98. O’Leary has argued that “[i]f, [equal treatment and complete free movement] are only
extended under insulated economic conditions protective of welfare benefits in the host Member
States. . . then it is clear that Community citizenship offers little which is not available under
the present free movement regime.” (The Evolving. . . op. cit. supra note 77, p. 99)
99. COM (2001) 257 final.
100. Adopted on 1 July 1998; see the Commission’s review of the panel’s recommendations
in COM (1998) 403.
101. This means that, in effect, the new directive would delete Arts. 10 and 11 of Regulation
1612/68, and would repeal entirely Regulation 1251/70 (JO 1970, L 142/24), Directives 64/221
(derogation on grounds of public policy, security and health, JO 1964, 850), 68/360, 73/148
(abolition of restrictions on movement and residence in respect of establishment and services,
O.J. 1973, L 172/14), 75/34 (right to remain after self-employment, O.J. 1975, L 14/10, 90/364,
90/365 and 93/96.
102. COM (2001) 257 final, para 1.3 of the explanatory memorandum.
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to create a new, permanent right of residence – no longer subject to finan-
cial conditions and ensuring “virtually complete equality of treatment with
nationals”.103 This is something of a hybrid between the residence directives
and the Portuguese suggestion in Grzelczyk, allowing (by temporal means)
for the creation of a substantive connection between an EU citizen and a host
State but removing the indefinite character of the residence directive criteria.
Critically, it is made absolutely clear in the explanatory memorandum that
“[a]quisition of the right of permanent residence entails a series of important
additional rights, such as access to social welfare in the host Member State
for all categories of persons benefiting from the directive and immunity from
expulsion from the territory of the Member State of residence.”104 Rather
curiously, however, the Commission had taken its first steps in respect of
the category of Union citizens who have never moved at all not in this draft
directive, so firmly rooted in citizenship and equality of treatment, but in a
measure presented via Title IV EC, discussed below.
Reflecting rather than refining the Court’s approach in Grzelczyk, the pro-
posed directive takes a slightly more complex approach to the residence rights
of students – they are listed as a separate category in Article 7 of the draft
directive, which would indicate initially that the sickness insurance and suf-
ficient resources criteria do not actually apply to them; but, in Article 8(4),
these conditions are reinstated.105 Significantly, Article 21(2) reiterates the
statement in Directive 93/96 that residence in a host Member State for pur-
poses of receiving education does not oblige that State to award maintenance
grants. But remarks by the Commission in this context are as confusing as
those of the Court in Grzelczyk, attempting to secure the Directive 93/96
position and yet to allow the impact of citizenship subtly to filter through and
affect it:
“Maintenance grants count as a social assistance in the broad sense of
the term and, therefore, students are not eligible for it under the terms
of this Directive, since they are required to assure the relevant national
authorities that they have sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden
on the public finances of the host Member State. . . Nonetheless, it should
not be forgotten that . . . students may not be discriminated against in other
fields on the grounds of nationality, such as when it comes to grants other
103. Ibid., Art. 14 of the draft directive; see also, paras. 2.1–2.2 of the explanatory
memorandum.
104. Ibid., p. 17 (emphasis added).
105. The new right of permanent residence would be especially meaningful for students who
acquire it after completing a four-year course of education in the host State, at which point
the current residence directive conditions would cease to apply, allowing the (former) students
to stay on in the host State with entitlements to social security on the same basis as home
nationals while, for example, looking for work.
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than maintenance grants or medium-term loans with special low interest
rates for students.”106
If anything, however, the decision in Grzelczyk goes even further, already
extending the principle of non-discrimination to include social assistance.
Because it can no longer be said so firmly that “. . . it is a matter for the host
Member State to decide whether it will extend social assistance provision
or sickness insurance coverage to persons not engaged in gainful activity, or
maintenance grants to Union citizens coming to study on its territory.”107
Until the Commission’s proposals translate into legal obligations, however,
the residence directives still provide the key. The Court has never stated out-
right that the directives no longer apply; its decisions do imply their continuing
effect, since the Court has actually tried to deal with, albeit to a very limited
extent, the substance of the sufficient resources condition. The advocates gen-
eral have been much more explicit in their views, with more recent opinions
indicating more clearly than before the view that the residence directive con-
ditions surely restrict the substance of Article 18(1) EC.108 Perhaps all that
can really be said on this particular point is that the scope of EU citizenship
is far from settled. What can be said more assertively, however, is that the
decisions in Martı´nez Sala and – even more acutely – Grzelczyk pierce the
preserve of national social security competence to an unprecedented degree;
and the repercussions of this, no doubt, cannot yet fully be appreciated. In the
process, the extent to which movement to and/or residence in another Mem-
ber State bears on an individual’s treatment thereafter has undergone radical
expansion; and so, yet again, the evolution of EC law affecting persons – via
citizenship more specifically – reveals a chasm which can be bridged only by
movement. As noted in section 2 above, the Court was adamant in Uecker
and Jacquet that the introduction of citizenship had not displaced the need to
establish a connecting factor with Community law in any given case; indeed,
the legitimacy of reverse discrimination as a corollary was confirmed plainly
by the Advocate General.109 Toner criticizes the narrow attitude which mani-
fests itself throughout that decision, however, arguing that the Court simply
did not take on board the fundamentally different opportunities created by EU
106. COM (2001) 257 final, p. 18.
107. Ibid., p. 29 (recital 19 of the preamble to the draft directive).
108. See esp. the Opinions of A.G. Alber in Grzelczyk, para 122 and A.G. Geelhoed in
Baumbast, para 114.
109. Uecker and Jacquet, Opinion of A.G. Fennelly, especially at para 25, where he observed
that “[t]here is . . . nothing in the Treaty which would prevent a Member State applying to a
situation which is purely internal and therefore, outside the scope of Community law, a national
provision whose application to a situation governed by Community law has been held to be
incompatible with the Treaty.”
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citizenship.110 Toner’s central thesis mirrors the thread of argument running
throughout this paper; she locates the debate squarely in the discourse of
citizenship – or, more properly, in a meaningful version of that concept. It is
a position all the more amplified by the decision in Grzelczyk. And so, the
requirement that someone must leave their own Member State in order to trig-
ger the advantages of Community law, viewed against strenuous Community
promotion of common citizenship bonds, seems, quite simply, to make less
sense than ever.
4. And the end?
The decisions in Kulzer or Singh or Grzelczyk have not proven to constitute
breaking points, although they did steer EC law towards a definite threshold.
The wholly internal rule seems as a result to be a shell of its Saunders self.
The decision in Uecker and Jacquet jars even with Singh, but it sits all the
more uneasily with the ascent of EU citizenship, which seems gradually
to be progressing the scope of EC law beyond work, beyond establishment
and beyond services. But it doesn’t yet go beyond movement. Given the
legislative and judicial choices that fall presently to be made by the EC
institutional actors, should it? And if it should, i.e. if the consequences of
reverse discrimination can no longer be accepted, then who exactly should
determine that this is so, and how could the sea-change be achieved in reality?
These issues will now be considered in turn.
4.1. Breaking point? Carpenter and the Court
If there is anything still surprising about the decision in Singh, it is perhaps
that the open-ended nature of the judgment has not really been tested until
now. In Carpenter, a non-Community (Philippine) national is claiming a right
of residence in the United Kingdom with her British spouse, on the grounds
110. “What is disappointing in the reasoning is the failure even to consider explicitly the
effect of Citizenship on the scope of the Treaty. Again, saying that Citizenship is not intended
to extend the scope of the Treaty ‘to matters having no link with Community law’ simply begs
the question of what kind of link with Community law is necessary to bring the situation within
the scope of the Treaty . . . Does the Union Citizen only become a Union Citizen when they
step outside the confines of their own Member State? . . . If Citizenship is to have real meaning,
in particular by creating a direct link between the Union and the Citizens, then it may become
increasingly unacceptable to say to the majority of Citizens who do not make use of their
rights under the Treaty to live and work in other Member States that Community law has no
application to their situation.” Toner, op. cit. supra note 77, 169–70 (emphasis in original).
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that he provides services from time to time in other Member States.111 The
questions before the Court of Justice read as follows:
“In circumstances where:
(a) a national of a Member State, who is established in that Member State
and who provides services to persons in other Member States; and
(b) has a spouse who is not a national of a Member State;
can the non-national spouse rely on
(i) Article 49 EC and/or
(ii) Directive 73/148/EEC
to provide the non-national spouse with the right to reside with his or her
spouse in his or her spouse’s Member State of origin?
Is the answer to the question referred different if the non-national spouse
indirectly assists the national of a Member State in carrying on the provi-
sion of services in other Member States by carrying out childcare?”112
Essentially, the applicant is claiming that her situation parallels that of Mr
Singh and, more specifically, that “. . . persons who provide services should
not have less rights.”113 The peculiar result of reverse discrimination is also
alluded to where Mrs Carpenter argues that ”. . . her spouse must have the
same Community law rights in the UK as in another Member State. If he took
his spouse with him to another Member State, that Member State would have
to allow both spouses to enter.”114 It is difficult to argue with the logic of these
submissions; however, the implications of granting her a right of residence
are considerably broader than was the case in Singh. Although the applicant
referred to the “parallel nature” of work, establishment and services, the scope
of the latter is infinitely more extensive; although relatively few EU citizens
provide services in other Member States, how many have not received them?
The Court’s expansive interpretation of services in Bickel – and the resultant
ease with which any cross-border transaction will trigger EC law to some
extent – must be borne in mind here. Can all of these – including some fairly
tenuous – links with Community law establish residence rights for family
members which override the policies and intentions of national immigration
authorities? And, if so, then how can the minute group of individuals who
have never come within the scope of EC law in any way be left outside? In
some ways, then, it is not surprising that the Commission has argued against
this extension of Singh.115
111. Carpenter, supra note 70; Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl of 13 Sept. 2001.
112. See O.J. 2000, C 122/14.
113. Carpenter, Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl, para 15.
114. Ibid., para 14.
115. Ibid., paras. 26–29; the Commission distinguishes between leaving one’s Member State
of origin to work in another, and “merely” providing services and never intending actually to
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Of course, the Court does not have to go beyond the specific context of
service providers in Carpenter itself; but its decision will surely conduct the
course of EC law in the direction set out above – in the direction of purely
internal effect, at least in the context of family member residence rights. And,
if residence rights, what thereafter? So it must be asked whether the character
of services is somehow different from work and/or establishment: not in terms
of triggering EC law per se, but thinking more of potential limitations that
might attach – effecting something of a halt at Carpenter and not necessarily
flowing into service receipt. As noted already, and in contrast to the Advocate
General, the Court in Singh did not really address the need for a connect-
ing factor to exist vis-a`-vis the rights enjoyed in another Member State and
those claimed upon return home; instead, the Court promoted the notion of
deterrence. In Carpenter, Advocate General Stix-Hackl did not consider it
necessary to explore the second question referred to the Court, i.e. the extent
to which Mrs Carpenter actually enabled her spouse to provide services by
her provision of childcare (which could be said to reflect both the connecting
factor and deterrence approaches). The Advocate General discussed instead
the effects of reverse discrimination in the context of spousal residence rights,
before addressing the extent to which the provision of services can remove
a set of circumstances from the “purely internal” reserve.116 Overall, she
stressed that the differences between the facts in Carpenter and Singh were
“not legally significant”.117 This means that Mr Carpenter, an exerciser of
Community rights via the provision of services, should thereby enjoy the
same rights in his own Member State as in any of the other fourteen potential
host States. This clearly reflects the philosophy of Singh;118 but it does not
invoke the deterrence principle which was also (presumably) decisive in the
earlier case. The deterrence factor is raised in Carpenter almost in passing;119
but another consideration seems to take precedence – respect for fundamental
rights, realizing to some extent the renowned vision of European citizen-
become established in any other Member State, and suggests that the Carpenter case should
instead be aligned with Morson and Jhanjan.
116. Carpenter, Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl, paras. 52–58 and 61–63 respectively; to illus-
trate the breadth of possibility here, she referred inter alia to Joined Cases C-51/96 & C-191/97,
Delie`ge v. Ligue francophone de judo et disciplines associe´es ASBL, [2000] ECR I-2549 (ath-
lete competing in another Member State) and Joined Cases C-34–36/95, Konsumentombuds-
mannen v. De Agostini and TV-Shop, [1997] ECR I-3843 (where there is no physical movement
by either the provider or recipient of services, but the services themselves are provided across
a frontier).
117. Carpenter, Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl, para 64 et seq.
118. Singh, para 23.
119. Carpenter, Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl, para 78.
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ship sketched by Advocate General Jacobs in Konstantinidis, even before
Maastricht.120
The only real limitation proposed by Advocate General Stix-Hackl in Car-
penter is, in essence, a temporal one – that Mrs Carpenter has residence rights
in the UK only so long as her husband continues to provide services in other
Member States.121 Briefly turning to the risk of abuse here – essentially, that
Community nationals might endeavour to bring themselves within the scope
of the Treaty purely to evade national immigration decisions – the Advocate
General simply notes that no such concern existed (or was claimed by the
United Kingdom) in the present case.122 She did not grapple with this ques-
tion in a more general sense, even though, as noted above, she would have
had curtailing authority from which to draw on this point.123 Moreover, the
potential for what might be termed “deliberate” service provision is, given
the both vast and temporary character of services, surely more difficult to rein
in than work or establishment.
The questions referred in Carpenter present a number of choices for the
Court. The strictest route would be to distinguish Singh and deny home
residence rights in respect of service provision – in other words, to follow
the submissions of the Commission. Something of a middle-ground might
be achieved by granting residence rights to Mrs Carpenter but hinging that
decision on the second question referred, thus emphasizing the element of
deterrence. Finally, to extend the reach of EC law most completely, the Court
could follow the Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl, which takes the
principles established in Singh considerably further. This would ensure the
most comprehensive protection for individuals exercising (any) Community
rights or freedoms. The Court need go no further than service providers
in Carpenter itself, but the slippery slope of service receipt will inevitably
materialize in consequence. And if short cross-border trips can be held to
justify residence rights at home for third country nationals, then the criterion
of movement as a connecting factor becomes at once empowering and futile.
It is unlikely that, as a stratagem, it could be contained to movement or to
residence rights; an expansive decision in Carpenter would thus mark the
beginning of the end for reverse discrimination more generally, at least in the
context of (natural) persons. This would be a remarkable step for the Court
to initiate. In the present climate of law reform, it would not be acting alone,
however.
120. Ibid., paras. 80 et seq.; see also Opinion of A.G. Jacobs in Case C-168/91, Konstantinidis
v. Stadt Altensteig, Standesamt, & Landratsamt Calw, Ordnungsamt, [1993] ECR I-1191, esp.
at para 46.
121. Carpenter, Opinion of A.G. Stix-Hackl, para 73.
122. Ibid., paras. 74–5.
123. See notes 71 and 72 supra.
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4.2. The consequences of citizenship: The Commission proposals
If the outcome of Carpenter seems precipitous, then the ideas recently tabled
by the Commission are even more controversial. Tucked away in the midst
of a Title IV EC proposal, for a draft directive on family reunification,124 lies
Article 3(1)(c), which seeks to bring Union citizens who have never exercised
their right to move at all within the scope of EC law; Article 4 of the same
draft directive establishes how:
“By way of derogation from this Directive, the family reunification of
third-country nationals who are family members of a citizen of the Union
residing in the Member State of which he is a national and who has
not exercised his right to free movement of persons, is governed mutatis
mutandis by Articles 10, 11 and 12 of Council Regulation (EEC) No
1612/68 and by the other provisions of Community law listed in the
Annex.”
The proposal amounts, in effect, to a legislative reversal of Morson and
Jhanjan; in time, it may well provide solace for the Carpenters if the Court
does not. The rationale behind this exceptional move is found in the ninth
recital of the draft directive’s preamble, which states simply that it is “to avoid
discriminating between citizens of the Union who exercise their right to free
movement and those who do not”. In the explanatory memorandum attached
to the proposal, the Commission acknowledged that this was “hitherto” a
purely internal situation, “subject solely to national rules”. But it argued
that the resulting “unwarranted” difference between Union citizens who have
moved and those that have not generates a gap which must be filled, on the
grounds that “Union citizenship is indivisible”.
Like the applicant’s submissions in Carpenter, this cannot be disputed in
terms of logic. In the first instance, however, whether this aspect of the pro-
posal survives Council adoption remains to be seen. It would probably have
been wise to predict Member State antagonism, given the potent intrusion
into domestic immigration competence mooted. At the time of writing, how-
ever, the matter has not prompted any substantive discussion – within either
the Economic and Social Committee125 or the European Parliament;126 but,
perhaps more astonishingly, the provision does not appear to have caused (to
date, at least) any ripples within the Council at all.127 But even if the directive
124. COM (1999) 638 final.
125. See O.J. 2000, C 204/9; the existence of the provision is noted (see para 1.5) but its
implications are not subsequently discussed (or even mentioned).
126. See A5-201/2000 and O.J. 2001, C 62/4.
127. Other aspects of the proposal were discussed at the Justice, Home Affairs and Civil
Protection Council from 28–9 May 2001 (see O.J. 2001, C 01/203) and on 27 Sept. 2001 (O.J.
2001, C 01/334).
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is adopted, should a bid to offset reverse discrimination really be rooted in
Title IV EC? The (third country) nationality of family members has never
been sufficient to trigger a Community law link; but this is not what would
be transcended. The substantive effect of the proposal is tied to Regulation
1612/68; and no longer needing to be a worker to come within its scope is
in fact an application of Martı´nez Sala. This may seem unorthodox, but it is
a mechanism which stems wholly from the reasoning of the Court. A more
fundamental difficulty with Title IV as legal basis is that its scope of applica-
tion is limited in a geographical sense, in respect of Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom.128 Because of this, the danger for discrepancies in standards
of treatment remains a real one, with rights of residence for family members
potentially depending still on the nationality of the EU citizen. Moreover, it
would seem that family reunification rights for non-moving citizens could
probably have been brought within the open-ended wording of Article 18
EC, perhaps as part of the Commission’s proposed catch-all movement and
residence rules.
In any event, now that the Commission has taken the question on board,
the reverse discrimination principle looks set to undergo a radical overhaul. It
is doubtful that the effects could (or should) be contained to family residence
rights. All of the case law discussed in this paper has chipped away at the logic
of Saunders, even if never quite displacing it entirely. The Court may take that
crucial step in Carpenter; but even if it doesn’t, it is likely that the step will
be taken legislatively. And so, we are poised on the brink of a fundamental
change to the scope of application of EC law. Leaving things as they stand
(i.e. allowing the legitimacy of reverse discrimination) does not seem to be an
option – even in legal terms, given the evolution of EC law as it affects persons
in recent years. But the consequences actually of changing things should not
be underestimated, in ideological and political terms as well as anything else.
The choices currently being made by the Court and Commission seem more
and more to lead towards an inevitable step. But what deserves carefully to
be considered is who exactly should take it, and how.
4.3. “Curing” reverse discrimination: Whose task?
Writing on the decision in Singh, White drew from the views of Advoc-
ate General Mischo delivered almost a decade before then; in relation to
the free movement of goods, the Advocate General remarked that “[r]everse
discrimination is clearly impossible in the long run within a true common
128. See the Protocols annexed to the EC Treaty and TEU on the respective positions of
Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom as regards their opt-outs from the development and
application of EC and EU immigration law; see also Art. 69 EC.
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market, which must of necessity be based on the principle of equal treatment.
Such discrimination must be eliminated by means of the harmonization of
legislation.”129 This comment highlights two basic points; first, a conviction
that reverse discrimination needed to be corrected and, second, that Com-
munity harmonization was the way in which this should be done. White
transferred the Advocate General’s logic to the free movement of persons,
basing his justification for this on the concept of EU citizenship.130 The Com-
mission’s proposals on family reunification certainly fit with this view. But it
cannot be assumed or taken for granted that the second part of the Advocate
General’s proposition necessarily flows from the first; reverse discrimination
may well be a real problem, but it is not at all clear how best it can be
redressed.
4.3.1. Extreme measures: What not to do
If the argument is framed in terms of “gaps” in protection from the perspective
of individuals, things could simply be left as they are, allowing any anomalies
to persist; essentially, this suggests that the advantages ascribed to consistency
of treatment and the uniform application of Community law reach their limit
at the wall of the purely internal reserve. But questions raised throughout this
paper about the (in)coherence of the “purely internal” rule in ECJ case law,
the expanding reach of EC law and its impact on the rights and freedoms
of individuals and the corollary supposition that occurrences of reverse dis-
crimination will increase as a result, cannot be dismissed so readily merely
by curbing the efficiency of uniformity. There is also a question of public
perception here. Where instances of reverse discrimination are highlighted in
the public domain – as they have been in Scotland and the UK more generally
on the question of Scottish university fees, for example – the typical conclu-
sion is not that EC law “gives” certain rights to nationals of other Member
States over and above those available domestically, but that the Community
has somehow deprived home nationals of the benefit in question. This is not
actually true, but it is a common misunderstanding. And is it truly rational to
say to an aggrieved complainant that things would be different/better if only,
for example, s/he held a diploma from any Member State but his/her own?
However, as stated expressly at the beginning of this paper, a wholly central-
ized or “absolute” EU competence is equally untenable; it is simply erroneous
to argue that all Member State issues should, in fact, become Community
issues. It doesn’t wash in terms of logic, nor does it take account of the deep-
seated social, cultural, political and financial objections that would oppose
such a radical move in the first place. The division of competence must instead
129. Joined Cases 80 & 159/85, Nederlandse Bakkerij Stichting v. EDAH, [1986] ECR 3359,
Opinion of A.G. Mischo, p. 3375.
130. White, op. cit. supra note 71, 532.
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be separated out. And the character of EC law on the free movement of per-
sons, shot through as it is with the emerging consequences of citizenship, does
merit a revision of the legitimacy of reverse discrimination – even more so,
it is submitted, than the interests of the internal market in the free movement
of goods. Establishing a distinction between these freedoms would reflect a
difference in approach already evident between goods as commodities and
people as, basically, people;131 but it is not intended here to argue the case for
or against reverse discrimination in respect of goods, but simply to say that
whatever (market) arguments can be put forward in that context are shored
up more deeply still in respect of persons.
There is more than one way in which this objective could be realized,
however. Several authors have sited the debate in the distribution of compet-
ence, reflecting the viewpoints of Cannizzaro and Poiares Maduro discussed
above when looking at the normative character of reverse discrimination. For
example, O’Leary has suggested that “[t]he crux of maintaining the distinc-
tion between Community and internal cases is the assertion of which level
of authority – Community or national – remains competent to regulate an
individual’s rights.”132 Similarly, Staples has argued that “[t]he omission on
behalf of the Community to address matters related to reverse discrimination
is explained by the principle of attribution of powers that has limited Com-
munity competence to those policy areas found in the [EC] Treaty.”133 The
solution must lie, then, within the domain of shared or concurrent compet-
ence and so, in practical terms, the options can be broken down as follows.
First, Member State legislatures could themselves take on board a respons-
ibility to “. . . trad[e] up to Community standards. . . .”134 Second, this could
also be achieved via national courts. Third, reverse discrimination could be
“. . . eliminated by the Community legislature itself. . . .”135 Or, finally, this
step could be taken by the Court of Justice. Two layers of conflict are revealed
by organizing the question in this way. First, at the level of governance: which
level – EC or national – should bear the responsibility for reform? Second, on
the type of governance at either level – legislative or judicial – which should
actually act.
4.3.2. A national solution to an EC “problem”
Looking first at the possibility for Member State redress, this means in effect
that the influence of the EC on domestic standards would be a catalytic
131. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
132. O’Leary , The Evolving. . . , op. cit. supra note 77, p. 276.
133. Staples, The Legal Status of Third Country Nationals resident in the European Union
(The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 15.
134. White, op. cit. supra note 71, 532.
135. A.G. Stix-Hackl in Carpenter, para 58.
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one, leaving the responsibility for actual change at Member State level and
thus skirting more difficult competence and sovereignty questions. The fact
remains that domestic Member State standards would still be “traded up” to
their Community counterparts, generating something of an indirect harmon-
ization process. If Member State responsibility is seen to flow from, but is not
strictly governed by, Community requirements, then both effectiveness and
pragmatism are well served.136 A defined catalytic function for the EC in this
way demands more, however, than an amended legal framework; it would
be perilously naı¨ve to underestimate the extent of the required corresponding
shift in political culture. Furthermore, there remains a danger of inconsist-
ency of rights, if the EC impetus of domestic law reform is to be an entirely
voluntary and non-binding one. The catalytic approach may well work for
some competence spheres, and particularly for especially sensitive ones or in
areas of competence still embryonic at EU level,137 but it is not necessarily
the best approach for matters now rooted in the ideology of citizenship.
The Court of Justice has looked, albeit peripherally, at the potential role
of national courts in this regard. In Steen II, for example, and having found
in Steen I that the facts of the case were wholly internal, the Court held as
follows:
“It is for the national court, faced with a question of national law, to
determine whether there is any discrimination under that law and whether
that discrimination must be eliminated and, if so, how . . . Community law
does not preclude a national court from examining the compatibility with
its constitution of a national rule which, in a situation unconnected with
any of the situations contemplated by Community law, treats national
workers less favourably than nationals from other Member States.”138
In other words, any obligation to cure reverse discrimination must, the Court
held, stem from national law. This reflects the situation which arose in Pistre,
discussed above;139 it seems also to have informed the national judge’s ref-
erence in Angonese,140 although the point was not picked up in either case
by the Court of Justice. Poiares Maduro seems to favour the capacity of
national courts over the ”. . . strong risks of majoritarian bias . . . existing in
the national political process . . . ”, submitting, therefore, that “. . . national
courts should be empowered to decide when reverse discrimination is accept-
136. This idea was reflected to a certain extent in the “concentric circles” model of EC human
rights competence developed by Lenaerts almost a decade ago (see Lenaerts, “Fundamental
rights to be included in a Community catalogue”, 16 EL Rev. (1991), 367–390).
137. In this context, see Nic Shuibhne, op. cit. supra note 3, pp. 193–6.
138. Case C-132/93, Steen v. Deutsche Bundespost, [1994] ECR I-2715, paras. 10–11; see
also, Johnson and O’Keeffe, op. cit. supra note 69, 1339–40.
139. See note 36 et seq. supra and accompanying text.
140. See Angonese, para 14; see also, Opinion of A.G. Fennelly, para 7.
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able taking into account the broader public interests and the burden placed
on the home nationals discriminated against.”141 Although writing earlier in
time, Cannizzaro questioned the legitimacy of the national court approach;142
he pointed out that the mechanism would work only in one direction, given
that national judges cannot assess the validity of Community measures and,
even more basically, that the national legal order might not actually provide
for judicial review or might provide only for limited forms. Elaborating on
the method of “empowerment” for national courts, however, Poiares Maduro
suggested that the ECJ “. . . should simply state that it is for national courts,
having regard to the facts of the case, to assess whether the discrimination
found in national rules against home nationals can be justified in light of
specific national interests.”143 This goes beyond a basic restatement of Steen
II, since not all national courts are “empowered” at national level to perform
this interpretative task. Poiares Maduro argues that the requisite authority can
be implied from the supremacy of EC law, but it is stretching things a bit to
argue that the ECJ alone should, or even can, fill this particular legitimacy
gap; until EC law itself can accommodate wholly internal situations, how can
its “supremacy” actually work here? And more fundamentally still, the reality
that national courts may vary in their interpretation as to whether any given
instance of reverse discrimination should be undone (both within and across
Member States) generates considerable inconsistencies in the treatment of
individuals – the very result of reverse discrimination that is surely most
injurious in the first place.
4.3.3. An EC answer
On another view, the EC dimension of the reverse discrimination problem
means that it can be successfully addressed only by EC measures. This is
not necessarily a straightforward solution either; Cannizzaro, for example,
points out that “. . . it may not seem appropriate to compare with regard
to the Community principle of equality different sets of norms, belonging
to different legal systems and having different aims [and that] [n]ational
activities which would come under consideration with respect to the issue of
reverse discrimination are not intended to implement Community obligations
and may thus seem to fall outside the field of application of EC law.”144 The
basic question here, then, is the extent to which the evolution of EC law as it
affects persons – and the reality of EU citizenship in particular – can now be
said to override these concerns. And, on balance, it is submitted that action via
Community measures avoids the legitimacy and inconsistency pitfalls of the
141. Poiares Maduro, op. cit. supra note 8, p. 137.
142. Cannizzaro, op. cit. supra note 29, 31–2.
143. Poiares Maduro, op. cit. supra note 8, p. 139.
144. Cannizzaro, op. cit. supra note 29, 32.
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national court (or legislature) approach. Writing even before the introduction
of EU citizenship, Pickup had argued while reverse discrimination “. . . may
be eliminated by the enactment of Community legislation, but given the
difficulties and expense of dealing with such an enormous area of strong
national interest . . . it would be infinitely more desirable for the Court of
Justice to breath (sic) life and sense into its interpretation of Article [39] and
freedom of movement for workers.”145 But is it not even more divisive for
the Court rather than the legislature to seek to change precisely such areas of
“strong national interest”?
This debate is obviously a much broader one which arises more or less
across the spectrum of EC law – most notoriously, perhaps, in the context of
sex discrimination. Employing the formula that sex discrimination in EC law
is based essentially if not exclusively on the sex of the person concerned, in P v.
S, the Court of Justice held that discrimination related to gender reassignment
came within the scope of Article 141 EC;146 but in Grant (and, more recently,
in D and Sweden), it was found that discrimination related to sexual orientation
did not.147 The substantive issues at play in all of these decisions are well
documented and will not be discussed here;148 but something of a sub-plot
can be discerned i.e. the role of the judiciary in law reform. The views of
Advocate General Tesauro in P v. S are particularly striking in this regard:
“To my mind, the law cannot cut itself off from society as it actually is,
and must not fail to adjust to it as quickly as possible. Otherwise it risks
imposing outdated views and taking on a static role . . . I consider that it
would be a pity to miss this opportunity of leaving a mark of undeniable
civil substance, by taking a decision which is bold but fair and legally
correct, inasmuch as it is undeniably based on and consonant with the
great value of equality.”149
The Court’s decision in that case clearly reflects the spirit of this view, which
is probably why its subsequent stance in Grant – which asserted that “[i]t is
for the legislature alone to adopt, if appropriate, measures which may affect
[the present state of the law]”150 – seems all the more conspicuously cautious;
it also went directly against the views of Advocate General Elmer in the case.
It may be that, in Grant and D, the Court was mindful of Article 13 EC,
which empowers the Community legislature to adopt measures in order to
145. Pickup, op. cit. supra note 8, 139.
146. Case C-13/94, P v. S and Cornwall County Council, [1996] ECR I-2143.
147. Case C-249/96, Grant v. South West Trains, [1998] ECR I-621 and Case C-122/99, D
and Sweden v. Council, [2001] I-4319.
148. See e.g. Iris Canor, “Equality for lesbians and gay men in the European Community
legal order – ‘they shall be male and female’?”, 7 MJ (2000), 273.
149. P v. S, Opinion of A.G. Tesauro, paras. 9 and 24.
150. Grant, para 35; see also, D and Sweden, paras. 38 and 49.
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combat discrimination on a number of grounds, including sexual orientation.
But such deference to the legislature doesn’t really match with the Court’s
more activist approach in the domain of, for example, the implications of
citizenship. The underlying issue – the role of the judiciary – has been raised
most recently by Advocate General Geelhoed in Baumbast, given that Reg-
ulation 1612/68 has never been amended by the legislature, notwithstanding
considerable change in the interim – both legal and social.151 The particular
question being considered by the Advocate General is the changing nature
of family relationships; having highlighted the inadequacy of Regulation
1612/68 properly to reflect the evolving social and legal reality, he argues that
“. . . the Court is therefore compelled, in interpreting [Regulation 1612/68] to
take into consideration not only the wording of the provisions themselves but
also the changed circumstances.”152 Fleshing out the ambit of this duty, the
Advocate General continued as follows:
“European legislation on freedom of movement for workers no longer
meets the needs of the time. In other words the legislation is in need of
overhaul. For those reasons Community law needs to be interpreted in
such a way as to take account of changes in social conditions. In that way
the lacunae which have appeared in Community legislation as a result of
a failure to overhaul it can be prevented from resulting in undesired legal
consequences.”153
The legitimacy of this approach is open to something of a jurisprudential
debate; but it certainly provides a strong mandate for the Court, one which
resonates sharply in the reverse discrimination debate. On the one hand, it
could be argued that the Court, taking a Grant and D line, should steer clear
of effecting such radical changes – in, ostensibly, EC law but, in reality, in
the laws of the Member States – which, otherwise, leave it open to charges
of (improper) judicial law-making. Allowing the legislature to work these
issues out allows more democratically for political discussion and for the
involvement of the Member States, acting via the Council, and the people, via
151. Baumbast, Opinion of A.G. Geelhoed, para 19 et seq. Many of the issues raised in this
case – including, e.g., the status of cohabiting partners and of divorced persons, as well as the
status of same sex partners – are being considered at present by the EC legislature: see e.g. the
1998 proposals for reforming Regulation 1612/68 (see note 89 supra), and the proposals on
the right of movement and residence (note 99 supra); see also, in the domain of third country
nationals, Proposal for a Council Directive concerning the Status of Third-Country Nationals
who are Long-Term Residents and Proposal for a Council Directive on the Right to Family
Reunification (COM (2001) 127 final (13 March 2001), and COM (1999) 638 final (1 Dec.
1999)/COM (2000) 624 final (10 Oct. 2000) respectively). The Court has been generous in
the context of divorced persons and Regulation 1408/71, see e.g. Humer, para 42 and Kulzer,
paras. 48 and 51–2.
152. Baumbast, Opinion of A.G. Geelhoed para 66.
153. Ibid., para 87.
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the European Parliament. The other side of this coin should also be raised,
however, i.e. the slowness with which the legislature actually acts. The 1999
family reunification proposal, for example, is still in something of a legislative
limbo; and even if the proposal is accepted, there will be a further time delay
before the directive will have to be transposed into national law. Yet another,
more complex, question needs also to be answered here: have the Member
States ever reversed legislatively the interpretative advances brought about
by the Court in the context of workers? They have certainly criticized many
of them; and yet, they abide by the consequences of decisions like Singh
and Martı´nez Sala. Does that in itself supply an indirect democratic mandate
which could be used now in the context of reverse discrimination?
5. Conclusion: Time to move on?
Referring to the work of D’Oliveira, Poiares Maduro reproduces the argument
that “. . . aiming at an internal market, or completing it, while at the same time
continuing to attach importance to the crossing of national frontiers is self-
contradictory.”154 If one applies an absolute definition of the internal market
(area with no internal borders), then this argument obviously rings true. But
even allowing for less radical interpretation – even accepting that degrees of
national frontiers or degrees of national competence still remain – develop-
ments in EC law on the free movement of persons have called the wholly
internal rule into question at the frontier of reverse discrimination, so that
D’Oliveira’s logic still resonates. Moreover, the extent to which the “human”
dimension of movement has been pushed now to the fore – entwining, as it
has, the ideology of “market” freedoms with the discourse of fundamental
or human “rights” (most explicitly so to date in Articles 18 EC and 45(1) of
the Charter) – has generated a far more complex picture of free movement
than is often appreciated. This can be bolstered further by reflecting on other
strands of the case law – the generosity of the scope attached to provisions
on the free movement of persons, the door opened (subtly) in Singh and,
perhaps most significantly of all, the continuous underpinning by the Court
of the implications of EU citizenship. All these legal developments have the
potential to impinge acutely on the rights and lives of countless EU citizens –
but almost exclusively only if they move, only if they leave their own Member
State and form some degree of connection, however temporary or financially
insignificant, thinking particularly of services, with any of the other fourteen.
154. Poiares Maduro, op. cit. supra note 8, p. 126, referring to Jessurun D’Oliveira, “Is
reverse discrimination still possible under the Single European Act?” in Forty Years On: The
Evolution of Postwar Private International Law in Europe (Deventer, Kluwer, 1990), p. 84.
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The extent to which EC law can matter in turn renders all the more artificial
the triggering condition of movement in the first place.
It is not that reverse discrimination is a new phenomenon; it is a long-
standing consequence of the long-standing wholly internal rule. But, taking
into account the integrative forces and legal revisions described throughout
this paper, both its existence and level of incidence have become less jus-
tifiable. Looking at the reach of decisions like Grzelczyk, and the potential
reach of Carpenter and recent legislative proposals, the negation of reverse
discrimination takes on the character of inevitability. In other words, it does
now seem time to move on. Even against the backdrop of the Laeken Declar-
ation and European Convention, and the urge somewhat holistically to reflect
on the direction of European integration promoted in consequence, the less
certain question is how exactly to proceed – or more accurately, who should
proceed. In the specific context of EC law on the (until now) movement of
persons, there is much political merit in fixing a catalytic responsibility at
domestic level; there is also, however, a very real danger of inconsistency
of effect and, in turn, retained inconsistency of opportunities for EU citizens
who don’t move anywhere. In the absence of a committed, concerted and
somewhat coordinated national effort, the locus of responsibility may well be
better assigned to the Community. Even here, another layer of conflict arises,
in the sense of deciding whether the reverse discrimination problem is one
best tackled legislatively or judicially. This debate spreads well beyond the
specific context of reverse discrimination and throws into focus the respective
roles of both arms of governance in the sphere of law reform. Significantly,
and perhaps encouragingly, however, we see something of a common object-
ive underlying pending advances in EC law. The EC legislature and judiciary
have an opportunity to proceed as one, so what remains to be seen is what
choices will actually be made – by the Court in Carpenter, by the legislature
as it addresses family reunification and citizenship. Perhaps a line will be
drawn under the expansionist potential so clearly now at the Community’s
disposal; even this, however, will have to be explained. If nothing else, the
scope of EC law, as it bears on EU citizens, should at least be a bit less
uncertain.
Postscript
Since the time of writing, two key developments have shifted the course of
the reverse discrimination debate once again. On 11 July 2002, the Court
extended an EC right of residence to Mrs Carpenter, invoking the deterrence
and effective exercise of Community rights doctrines stemming from Singh.
The judgment has thus fuelled considerably the expansionist momentum that
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has characterized the ECJ stance on the free movement of persons in recent
years. The Commission had seemed, on the contrary, to backtrack – in the most
recent version of its draft directive on family reunification (COM (2002) 225
final), the EU citizen dimension (what was draft Article 4) was removed. But
the Commission has postponed more than rejected the reverse discrimination
challenge; more precisely, it has tied the right of family reunification for
EU citizens who never move at all to its work on citizenship and movement
rights more generally and, in this vein, has suggested tantalizingly that “[t]he
alignment of the rights of all Union citizens to family reunification will be
reviewed later, once that recasting is complete.” The Commission might thus
appear more guarded initially but it has probably strengthened its arsenal by
removing the dubious link with Title IV EC and concentrating its efforts more
properly on EU citizenship and its consequences. This particular story seems,
therefore, far from over.
